#### **IP-Plus DDoS Protection Service**

**IP-Plus Engineering** 



# **IP-Plus Overview**


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#### some Fun Facts

- Largest Swiss ISP, founded as Uniplus in 1995 when Switch had to sell its commercial customers to PTT/Unisource Business Networks.
- mainly Corporate customers, connected through VDSL and CES (Carrier Ethernet Service)
- Residential and SME customers served through ex-Bluewin
- Upstream for all Swisscom services
- For 20 years we remained MPLS-free (but recently we enabled LDP for Asian routes)
- IPv4/IPv6 dual-stack for many years.
- All interfaces are in a public but not globally routed IP range.
- COPP to limit access to the routers control plane.



#### Swisscom IP-Plus<sup>®</sup> Internet Backbone Switzerland






# Swisscom IP-Plus<sup>®</sup> Internet Backbone




#### Swisscom IP-Plus<sup>®</sup> Internet Backbone North-Atlantic




# DDoS Protection Overview

#### IP-Plus<sup>®</sup> DDoS Protection Service since 2004




### Schematic of a Botnet Attack






## Schematic of a Botnet Attack





#### The latest flavor: Amplification Attacks Abuse of unprotected udp services



- source IP spoofing is still one of the biggest problems in the Internet
- only remedy is BCP38



### **Amplification Attacks**


- reflective DNS attacks: queries for ANY on open resolver
- NTP amplification attacks: queries for monlist on older ntpd
- unprotected SNMP daemons with default community string
- other unprotected (mostly legacy) udp services: qotd (udp/17), chargen (udp/19), ssdp (udp/1900)
- and since august RPC port mapper (udp/111)
- as a first line of defense we rate-limit these udp services at our Peering edge

Protocol	Bandwidth Amplification Factor	Vulnerable Command
DNS	28 to 54	see: TA13-088A [1]
NTP	556.9	see: TA14-013A [2]
SNMPv2	6.3	GetBulk request
NetBIOS	3.8	Name resolution
SSDP	30.8	SEARCH request
CharGEN	358.8	Character generation request
QOTD	140.3	Quote request
BitTorrent	3.8	File search
Kad	16.3	Peer list exchange
Quake Network Protocol	63.9	Server info exchange
Steam Protocol	5.5	Server info exchange





• Our largest attack so far was around 55 Gbps, current attacks in the Internet are over 400 Gbps:




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
swisscom

## Application Layer Attacks





#### Attack Motivation





- Our DDoS Protection platform detects and classifies DDoS attacks and other threats/anomalies against customers and infrastructure
- We collect Netflow (sampled 1/1000)/BGP/SNMP data at all Peering edge and core routers and correlate these —> Detection only up to Layer4

#### Detection methods:

- Misuse Detection
  - based on threshold for a set of packet types
- Profiled Detection
  - based on deviation from baseline (usual traffic behavior)
- LocationIP Detection
  - Alert on traffic spikes from unexpected countries




# 2<sup>nd</sup> Level Anomaly Reports

 Characterization shows the major components involved in each anomaly

 Graph shows how traffic compares to expected rates

 Links to raw flow queries, mitigation and reporting options for the anomaly



#### Alert Characterization


Sources	Source Ports	Destinations	Destination Ports	Protocols
0.0.0.0/0 2 195.0.0.0/8 2	123 (ntp) 0 - 32767	188.60.249.245/32 2	60 (www-http) 0 - 32767	udp (17)
Generate Raw Flo	View Raw F	ows Report		

#### Affected Routers

	Severity Level	Expected	Observed bps		Observed pps		
			Мак	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
Router geb-025 138.187.128.1	Medium	3.00 Mpps	18.56 Gbps	10.74 Gbps	4.96 Mpps	2.87 Mpps	Details
Interface (SNMP 28) TendigED/0/0/4 114.141.111.111.4			483.71 Hops	389.85 Mbps	129.21 Kpps	104.17 Крря	Details
Interface (SNMP 32) TenGigE0/0/0/8 138.187.155.18			6.49 Gbps	3.52 Gbps	1.74 Mpps	941.08 Kpps	Details




#### **Threat Mitigation**



Peakflow receives Netflow, BGP and SNMP information from all edge and core routers, correlates this information and raises an alert (email, SMS, Syslog...) if a **high** anomaly is detected. No auto-mitigation will be started!



#### **Threat Mitigation**



If an operator decides to start a mitigation, Peakflow injects a BGP host route for the attacked IP with the TMSs address as a new next-hop

-> traffic flows now to the TMS instead, is mitigated and re-routed through a tunnel directly to the customer's CPE.



## Threat Mitigation - The Countermeasures

- Once the traffic flows through the TMS we have full DPI capabilities to analyze the traffic
- TMS offers a rich set of permanently growing and highly sophisticated countermeasures for surgical and effective mitigation
- e.g.
  - Black / White Filter Lists
  - Zombie Removal
  - TCP SYN Authentication (Multiple)
  - LocationIP Policing
  - SSL Negotiation Filtering



